The Horizon of Rights: Lessons from South Africa for the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage by Newstrom, Lisa
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 40
Issue 3 Fall 2007 Article 6
The Horizon of Rights: Lessons from South Africa
for the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-Sex
Marriage
Lisa Newstrom
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Newstrom, Lisa (2007) "The Horizon of Rights: Lessons from South Africa for the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage,"
Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 40: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol40/iss3/6
The Horizon of Rights: Lessons from
South Africa for the Post-Goodridge
Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage
Lisa Newstromt
Introduction ..................................................... 782
I. Background .............................................. 784
A. Constitutions in Context .............................. 784
1. Origins of Minority Protections ..................... 785
2. Constitutional Language ............................ 786
B. Gay Rights, Marriage Rights, and the Judiciary ......... 788
1. A Brief History: The United States .................. 789
2. A Brief History: South Africa ....................... 790
I . A nalysis .................................................. 79 1
A. Balancing Rights ...................................... 791
1. State Interests ..................................... 791
2. Liberty Interests ................................... 792
3. The "Threat" to Third Party Institutions ............. 794
B. The Context of Discrimination ........................ 795
1. W hy History M atters .............................. 796
2. Insiders and Outsiders ............................. 798
C. The International Question ............................ 800
1. What International Law Really States ............... 800
2. The Weight of International Opinion ................ 801
D. W hat's in a Nam e ..................................... 802
C onclusion ...................................................... 803
"The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
-Warren, C. J., Loving v. Virginia1
"Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code."
-Kennedy, J., Lawrence v. Texas2
t Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2008; B.A. Northwestern University,
2001; Managing Editor, Volume 41, Cornell International Law Journal. Thanks to
Professors Muna B. Ndulo and Marcia E. Greenberg for their instruction, to Nancy
Picknally, Elizabeth Rabe, Miguel Loza, and Kristyn Walker for valuable editing and
input, and to Joanna Hooste for research assistance.
1. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
2. 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
850) (1992)).
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"The horizon of rights is as limitless as the hopes and expectations of
humanity."
-Sachs, J., Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie3
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) individuals 4 have skyrocketed to prominence within
"mainstream" legal and political discourse in the United States. Although
social and religious conservatives have used these rights as a call-to-arms
in the country's "culture wars,"'5 various levels of government continue to
incrementally establish rights that were inconceivable fifty to sixty years
ago.6 Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions stand as legal milestones for
these rights. In 1996, in Romer v. Evers, the Court established that a desire
to disadvantage gays and lesbians cannot constitute a legitimate rational
basis for state action.7 Seven years later, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
held that criminalizing consensual sexual conduct in the home between
adults of the same sex violates due process and the right to privacy.8 These
key victories coalesced in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in
which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the state's
exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage violated the
liberty and equality safeguards of the state constitution and lacked a legiti-
mate legislative interest.9 As the focus in LGBT rights has shifted to the
issue of same-sex marriage after Goodridge, many states have faced litiga-
tion either challenging the exclusion of same-sex couples from existing
3. 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 564 (S. Mr.).
4. Throughout this paper, the terms "LGBT," "lesbian and gay," and simply "gay"
(in the modern, non-gender-restrictive meaning) may be used to describe individuals
who have significant relationships with members of the same sex that affect that individ-
ual's legal position in society. Although the use of these terms is under-inclusive, given
the variety of terms used by such individuals to identify themselves, this paper will use
them for the sake of simplicity. In keeping with common parlance, same-sex couples
may likewise be referred to as "gay couples," though one or both partners may identify
as having a different sexual orientation. This paper avoids the term "homosexual,"
given the term's historical link to the treatment of same-sex attraction as a psychiatric
disorder. For a more generalized discussion of these and other labels relating to sexual
orientation, see generally Don Kulick, Gay and Lesbian Language, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHRO-
POLOGY 243 (2000).
5. See, e.g., George R. Edwards, A Critique of Creationist Honophobia, in HOMOSExU-
ALITY AND RELIGION 95 (Richard Hasbany ed., 1989); JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE
WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
6. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2006) (non-discrimination in employment); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2006) (non-discrimination in employment); ITHACA, N.Y.,
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION ch. 215, art. I, § 3 (2003) (non-discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, education, extension of credit, and various other settings); N.Y. ExEc.
LAW § 296 (2005) (Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act (SONDA), preventing
discrimination in a variety of settings).
7. See 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (state constitutional amendment barring judicial and
political remedies to claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation fails equal
protection standards).
8. See 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down the Texas anti-sodomy law).
9. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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marriage statutes or challenging newly-passed state constitutional amend-
ments relating to same-sex marriage. 10 In these post-Goodridge marriage
battles, same-sex couples have largely lost, although they have achieved
some qualified victories."
As U.S. courts have confronted same-sex marriage issues, several
countries around the world have also examined the issue of legal recogni-
tion for same-sex couples and have decided to either include same-sex
couples in existing marriage schemes or to create alternative schemes, such
as civil partnerships in the United Kingdom 12 or the pacte civil de solidarite
(civil solidarity pact) in France.1 3 In South Africa, the issue arose in the
context of Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie.14 Although South African
society is, in many ways, as traditional and conservative regarding sexual-
ity as American society,' 5 the South African Constitution of 1996 prohib-
ited discrimination based on sexual orientation, which, at that time, was
unique to South Africa. 16 In Fourie, the South African Constitutional
Court held that the constitution therefore required the government to
extend marriage rights to same-sex couples and granted Parliament one
year to formulate a remedy. 17
American courts have struggled to frame the issues involved in same-
sex marriage clearly because of the heated U.S. political debate and
because the U.S. Constitution does not address discrimination based upon
sexual orientation in the way it addresses discrimination based on factors
such as race and religion. The South African decision in Fourie provides a
unique opportunity to study how another court has framed and addressed
the legal issues involved in same-sex marriage. By comparing Fourie with
several recent American decisions, including the Court of Appeals of New
York's decision in Hernandez v. Robles,18 the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning,19 and the Supreme Court of New
Jersey's decision in Lewis v. Harris,20 future courts can improve their own
10. E.g., California (City & County of San Francisco v. State, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005)); Washington (Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash.
2006)).
11. Compare Andersen, 138 P.3d 963 (same-sex couples have no right to marry
under state constitution), with Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21 (NJ. 2006) (same-
sex couples entitled to protections the state affords married opposite-sex couples).
12. Civil Partnerships Act, 2004, ch. 33 (U.K.).
13. Law No. 99-944 of Nov. 15, 1999, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise
[JO.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 16, 1999, p. 16959.
14. 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
15. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE INT'L GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMM'N, MORE THAN A NAME: STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA 51 (2003); Clare Nullis, Same-Sex Marriage Law Takes Effect in S.
Africa, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2006, at A20; Shuaib Rahim, Out in Africa, NEW INTERNATION-
ALIST, Oct. 2000, at 14.
16. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 9; Nullis, supra note 15, at A20; Rahim, supra note
15, at 14.
17. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 585-86 (S. Afr.).
18. 7 N.Y.3d 338 (N.Y. 2006).
19. 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
20. 908 A.2d 196 (NJ. 2006).
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analyses.
Part I of this Note briefly establishes the relevant legal background of
gay rights and same-sex marriage in the United States and South Africa. In
Part II, the Note begins its analysis by comparing the way Fourie and the
American decisions address: (1) the balancing of the state's interest in leg-
islating the social institution of marriage with its interest in individual
rights and (2) the importance of examining context in order to evaluate
discrimination. The former, discussed in Part II.A, constitutes the crux of
discrimination jurisprudence in both countries and is at the legal heart of
the highlighted cases. The latter, discussed in Part I.B, is an issue largely
ignored by the American marriage decisions, yet Fourie demonstrates how
the context of discrimination is crucial to an accurate balancing result.
Part II.C analyzes the role that international and foreign law might play in
same-sex marriage decisions and what these bodies of law actually state.
This is an important analysis because South African courts regularly refer
to international jurisprudence and some American courts seem to be cau-
tiously exploring foreign law as a source of additional insight on the new
and often murky issues involved in same-sex marriages. Finally, Part II.D
addresses the significance of what states choose to call the structures that
they create to protect and recognize relationships, an issue upon which
Fourie touches cautiously. As decisions like Fourie and Lewis assign the
forming and naming of remedies to legislative bodies, parties are likely to
litigate the significance of the name "marriage" in many future cases.
I. Background
In order to provide valid insight, a comparison of same-sex marriage
in South Africa and the United States requires an understanding of the
relevant legal context in each of these countries and the ways in which the
American and South African systems coincide or differ. This section first
provides the background required for a basic understanding of each coun-
try's constitution, focusing on provisions for minority protection. Next,
because the United States operates under a common law system and South
Africa operates on a civil/common law hybrid, the section explores the
relevant case law and judicial tests applicable to same-sex marriage in these
different contexts.2 1 The marked similarities in constitutional require-
ments and the comparable use of judicial balancing tests illustrate the
potential for simple migration of ideas: American judges may, without
undue hardship, look to South African decisions for alternative approaches
to the issues at stake in same-sex marriage.
A. Constitutions in Context
Like American law, South African law originated in a colonial past.
The Dutch and British influences in South Africa created a hybrid legal
system with aspects derived from both the common law and civil law sys-
21. See EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 3950, 4596 (Europa Publications Ltd. 2005)
(1959).
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tems, allowing for significant judicial power to interpret statutes and apply
constitutional principles. 2 2 Thus, although the labels of the American and
South African legal systems differ, their judges share similar power. Addi-
tionally, both nations' constitutions protect individual liberty with a Bill of
Rights. 23 The constitutions of the two states are nevertheless separated by
two hundred years of human experience, and this experience led South
Africans to incorporate into the text of their constitution some of the bal-
ancing tests that American courts have struggled to establish throughout
this time. 24 The result in cases analyzing government authority to limit
individual rights, however, is sufficiently alike to yield workable
comparisons.
1. Origins of Minority Protections
The establishment of minority protections in the U.S. Constitution has
been an arduous uphill climb with a few grand leaps. The original drafters
failed to provide for any substantial individual rights. Although the Bill of
Rights created protections for religious and political opinion, it was silent
on matters of race and gender.2 5 With the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments adding hard-won protections for racial minorities, race
became the main focus of minority rights under U.S. constitutional law.2 6
Until after World War II, both legal and public discussions of minority
rights largely were silent on the issue of sexual orientation.2 7
From the 1960s onward, the Gay Rights Movement developed rapidly;
it is often categorized with other identity-based rights movements, such as
the Civil Rights Movement and Women's Liberation. 28 The Gay Rights
Movement, to some extent, has benefited from this association by building
on judicially recognized arguments supporting the constitutional rights of
religious and racial minorities as well as women.2 9 Unlike racial, religious,
or gender discrimination, however, U.S. federal law has never held that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is per se unconstitutional nor
has it deemed gays and lesbians a suspect class when statutes targeted or
excluded them.30
22. See HJ. Erasmus, The Interaction of Substantive Law and Procedure, in SOUTHERN
CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 141, 149-50 (Reinhard Zimmer-
mann & Daniel Visser eds., 1996).
23. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; S. AFR. CONST. 1996 arts. 7-39.
24. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 36.
25. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-VIL, amends. I-X.
26. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
27. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS Xi (2005).
28. See id. at 32-37.
29. Id. at xi.
30. Compare Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47 (2006) (upholding Solomon Amendment, which requires law schools, in order to
receive federal funding, to offer military recruiters the same access that they provide to
nonmilitary recruiters with the most favorable access), and Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that Boy Scouts of America could prohibit gay man from
being scout master), with U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (requiring heightened scrutiny
for sex-based discrimination).
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The history of LGBT rights in South Africa stands in stark contrast to
the U.S. movement. For years, legal protections for minorities in South
Africa were unthinkable under the specter of another remnant of the coun-
try's colonial past, the legal entrenchment of racial discrimination known
as apartheid. 3 1 When South Africa opened its doors to human rights at
the end of apartheid in 1996, it created a new and powerful constitution
that provided protections for individual rights and remedies for their viola-
tion.3 2 The 1996 Constitution empowered citizens, particularly minority
citizens, to create legal demands for their rights and the judiciary to ensure
that government actions support those rights.
3 3
The 1996 Constitution was, in many ways, intended to be a complete
break from all that apartheid had embodied and, thus, involved high levels
of popular participation in its formation.3 4 Given that South Africa had-
and continues to have-high levels of homophobia, 35 this process could
have been disastrous for lesbians and gay men, except that LGBT leaders
had formed coalitions with the African National Congress (ANC) and
United Democratic Front (UDF) before apartheid ended, when those
groups were relatively powerless and more willing to make unlikely alli-
ances to gather political support.36 When these groups gained power post-
apartheid, LGBT rights workers successfully ensured that the new constitu-
tion was the first in the world to include prohibitions on discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 37
2. Constitutional Language
Despite the divides of time and culture separating the U.S. Constitu-
tion from its South African counterpart, both documents are largely similar
in their treatment of minority rights. Both constitutions include provisions
for equal protection of individuals under the law and allow the judiciary to
grant remedies for equal protection violations, such as striking down legis-
lation found to be discriminatory. 3 8 Additionally, neither constitution
includes an express right to marry.39 The South African constitution is
unique because it directly addresses sexual orientation in its Equality
Clause, but a brief examination of the constitutional language shows that
31. See T.W. Bennett, African Land-A History of Dispossession, in SOUTHERN CROSS:
CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 22, at 65, 86-91 .
32. See KRISTIN HENRARD, MINORITY PROTECTION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
40-41 (2002).
33. See id. at 147.
34. Jacklyn Cock, Engendering Gay and Lesbian Rights: The Equality Clause in the
South African Constitution, 26 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 35, 35 (2003).
35. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE INT'L GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMM'N, supra note 15, at 51, 187-96 (documenting persistent violence and discrimina-
tion against gays and lesbians in South Africa despite constitutional protections); Cock,
supra note 34, at 40-41; Alex Duval Smith, Gay Rights (and Wrongs) in Africa, INDEP.
(London), Nov. 24, 2006, at 24.
36. Cock, supra note 34, at 36.
37. See S. AR. CONST. 1996 art. 9(3).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 9.
39. See U.S. CONST.; S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
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the wording of both documents is sufficiently similar to make a valid com-
parison of judicial interpretation possible. 40
Most U.S. arguments for same-sex marriage focus on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and similar clauses under state con-
stitutions, along with an implied right to privacy, sometimes framed as "a
right to intimate life."4 1 The Fourteenth Amendment instructs that: "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; . . .nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."4 2 Through ever-
evolving case law, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to require a balancing test that, broadly put, considers: (1) the
nature of the right restricted or the disability imposed, including such con-
cerns as the basis for the restriction and how well the restriction serves
that goal, and (2) the nature of the classification of those affected, includ-
ing whether the classification is over- or under-inclusive. 4 3 The Supreme
Court thus far has avoided the question of whether sexual orientation is at
least a semi-suspect classification,44 but the Court has used the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to review legislation
when a constitutional liberty is at stake. 4 5 Though not enumerated in the
Constitution, the Court has held marriage to be a fundamental right.
46
State constitutions, such as those in New York and New Jersey, largely echo
this Equal Protection language, and state courts have interpreted the
clauses using similar tests.
4 7
The Equality Clause and the Limitation of Rights Clause of the South
African constitution provided the heart of the Constitutional Court's analy-
sis in Fourie, as in other gay rights cases.48 The Equality Clause includes
the following provisions:
40. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 9(3).
41. See RICHARDS, supra note 27, at 128-29.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982) ("In applying the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek only the assurance that the
classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose....
[W]e have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a
'suspect class,' or that impinge upon the exercise of a 'fundamental right.' With respect
to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by
requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest .... [lin these limited circumstances we have
sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with
the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a
substantial interest of the State.").
44. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 574-75 (2003).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (making the same prohi-
bition on actions by the states); see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
46. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
47. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211-12 (NJ. 2006) (interpreting NJ. CONST.
art. I, § 1); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8-10 (N.Y. 2006) (interpreting N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 11).
48. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 555, 567 (S. Afr.).
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(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and free-
doms...
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status . . . [or] sexual orientation .... 49
The constitution sets clear boundaries for any limitation of the rights set
out in its Bill of Rights. These boundaries create a balancing test similar in
essence to the one used in American law, allowing a limitation only so long
as it is "reasonable and justifiable in ... [a] society based on human dig-
nity, equality and freedom" and balancing "(a) the nature of the right; (b)
the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent
of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and the purpose;
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose."50 Certain rights are
non-derogable and may not be limited by the South African government
under any circumstances. Sex is included among these non-derogable
rights but sexual orientation is not.
5 1
B. Gay Rights, Marriage Rights, and the Judiciary
In both the United States and South Africa, the case history working
up to same-sex marriage has tumbled onto the legal stage relatively quickly
over the last decade. Critics use this recent awareness as proof that gay
rights are a fabrication of modern Western liberalism, disconnected from
the long tradition of history.5 2 Perhaps more probable is the argument that
the struggle for gay marriage is the inevitable progression of a rights move-
ment whose members are just now emerging from centuries of forced
silence. 53 Though that silence has erased much of the historical record,
judges are beginning to recognize that the relative novelty of gay rights
claims cannot render neither the rights of individuals any less potent nor
the discrimination any less harmful.
5 4
49. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 9.
50. Id. at art. 36.
51. Id. at art. 37(5)(c).
52. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569-70 (2003) (suggesting nineteenth
century evidence rules afforded gays and lesbians some protections).
53. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR
BETTER OR WORSE? 14-20 (2006) (outlining the evolution of the fight for same-sex mar-
riage out of the fight for gay rights in general); Robert P. Cabaj, History of Gay Accept-
ance and Relationships, in ON THE ROAD TO SAME-SEx MARRIAGE 1, 1 (Robert P. Cabaj &
David W. Purcell eds., 1998) (providing an overview of past treatment of same-sex rela-
tionships and the development of same-sex marriage as a legal issue).
54. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72 (subordinating arguments about the long
historical disapproval of same-sex relations to more recent analysis of individual rights
to privacy); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003)
("[H]istory must yield to a more fully developed understanding of the invidious quality
of the discrimination"); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 229 (NJ. 2006) (Poritz, CJ.,
concurring and dissenting) ("Without analysis, our Court turns to history and tradition
and finds that marriage has never been available to same-sex couples. That may be so-
but the Court has not asked whether the limitation in our marriage laws, 'once thought
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1. A Brief History: The United States
Although most same-sex marriage cases have been brought in state
courts under state constitutions, these state cases have heavily relied on
the underpinnings of a triumvirate of landmark civil rights cases from the
U.S. Supreme Court: Loving v. Virginia,55 Romer v. Evans,56 and Lawrence
v. Texas. 57 In striking down a Virginia statute that criminalized interracial
marriage, the Court in Loving described marriage as both a "basic civil
right[ ]" and a "fundamental freedom" that is "essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness. ' 58 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was the
first to logically extend this reasoning to same-sex couples and find that
"the right to marry means little if it does not include the right to marry the
person of one's choice . . ."59 Despite the presence of a fundamental right,
the New York Court of Appeals and other courts have applied only a
rational basis test to marriage statutes that exclude same-sex couples. 60 In
Romer, the Court reiterated an earlier ruling that "a... bare desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government
interest[,]' 6 1 and in Lawrence, the Court struck down a state sodomy law,
condemning such laws as "an invitation" to discriminate against and
"demean[] the lives" of gays and lesbians.6 2 After Romer and Lawrence,
many states attempted to prevent any effort by gays and lesbians to achieve
marriage equality by passing statutes 63 or state constitutional amend-
ments64 specifically restricting marriage rights to opposite-sex couples.
necessary and proper in fact serve[s] only to oppress.' I would hold that plaintiffs have a
liberty interest in civil marriage that cannot be withheld by the State." (quoting*Law-
rence, 539 U.S. at 579)).
55. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
56. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
57. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
58. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. Although Loving addressed a state statute applying a
criminal penalty for interracial marriages, there can be little doubt that a statute "defin-
ing away" the issue, by defining valid marriage as the union of two persons of the same
race, would have suffered the same fate. Thus, a lack of criminal penalty associated with
gay marriage in a state where marriage is defined as the union of a man and a woman is
unpersuasive in distinguishing the result that the Court reached in Loving. For more on
Loving and comparisons between same-sex and interracial marriage, see infra Part II.B.1.
59. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.
60. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006).
61. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
62. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
63. E.g., Alabama (ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1998)); California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5(West 2004)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1999)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.04 (West 1997)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004)); Iowa (IowA CODE
ANN. § 595.2 (West 2001)); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-112 (1994 & Supp.
1999)); Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2003)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 51-1.2 (2003)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-08 (2004)); Ohio (OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2003)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-1-38(2004)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001)). The Superior Court of Wash-
ington declared Washington's anti-gay-marriage statute unconstitutional in Castle v.
Washington, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004).
64. Alaska (ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 25); Arkansas (ARK. CONST. amend. 83); Georgia
(GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, 11 1); Hawaii (HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 23); Kentucky (Ky. CONST.
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2. A Brief History: South Africa
For many around the world, the Fourie decision may have been shock-
ing, because few persons think of sub-Saharan Africa as a hotbed of gay
rights.65 Nevertheless, Fourie was not an isolated decision about imper-
missible discrimination in a single statute. Rather, it was the crystalliza-
tion of nearly a decade of minority rights jurisprudence, building up to a
fuller achievement of the Equality Clause's promise to gays and lesbians in
South Africa. 6 6 The new constitution took effect in 1996, but the old sod-
omy law was not eliminated until two years later.6 7 After the elimination of
the sodomy law, suits in 2000 and 2002 successfully established the right
of gays and lesbians to have a same-sex partner immigrate or receive the
portion of certain government pensions due to legal spouses.68 Following
these decisions, in 2003, the Constitutional Court upheld a same-sex
couple's right to adopt and raise children as co-parents. 69 The Fourie deci-
sion recognized the fundamental injustice of the current marriage statute
and set a time limit for Parliament to remedy the inequality by amending
the law, warning that if Parliament failed to pass legislation assuring same-
sex couples the same legal rights as heterosexual couples, inclusive lan-
guage would automatically be read into the existing statute. 70 After debat-
ing various forms of a Civil Union Act, some of which would have
restricted same-sex couples' options for relationship recognition, Parlia-
ment managed to beat the court-appointed deadline and passed a version
of the Act that allows both same-sex and opposite-sex couples the ability to
choose either civil marriage or a civil union.7 1 Supporters of same-sex
marriage continue to debate the adequacy of the Act as a remedy, while
homophobia and bureaucracy remain bars to marriage for many couples. 72
§ 233A); Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. 12, 15); Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25); Mis-
sissippi (MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A); Missouri (Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 33); Montana
(MONT. CONST. art. 13, § 7); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29); Nevada (NEV. CONST.
art. 1, § 21); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. 11, § 28); Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. XV,
§ 11); Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35); Oregon (OR. CONST. art. 15, § 5a); and
Utah (UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 29).
65. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
66. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF GAY RIGHTS 104-07, 116 (2002) (describing the progression of gay rights in South
Africa as a series of "court-driven benefits" resulting from courts "vigorously" applying
the equality principle to a series of situations, starting soon after the 1996 Constitution
entered into effect).
67. See Nat. Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA
6 (CC) (S. Ar.).
68. See Satchwell v. Pres. of the Rep. of S. ar. 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
69. See Du Toit v. Minister of Welfare & Population Develop. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC)
(S. Mr.).
70. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 585-86 (S. Afr.).
71. Compare Letter from Scott Long, Director, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender
Rights Program, Human Rights Watch, to Hon. Baleka Mbete, Speaker, National Assem-
bly of South Africa (Oct. 19, 2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/19/safric
14426.htm, with Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.).
72. See Nthateng Mhlambiso, Not All So Well with Civil Unions Act, BEHIND THE MASK,
Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.mask.org.za/article.php?catsouthafrica&id=1428 (citing
complaints that the Act allows state-employed marriage officers to refuse to perform
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II. Analysis
A. Balancing Rights
In order to balance the interests involved in pursuing same-sex mar-
riage rights, the courts must first recognize and analyze the importance of
civil marriage as a government institution. Two types of interests are legiti-
mately involved in such an analysis: state welfare interests and individual
liberty interests. 73 In addition, a third interest is often urged into consider-
ation: the interest of third party institutions, whether acknowledged as
religious interests or cloaked in the vague language of "the traditional insti-
tution of (opposite-sex) marriage." 74 As Fourie shows, there is no legiti-
mate legal basis for third-party claims that allowing same-sex couples to
marry would harm their own interests.75
1. State Interests
When analyzing the state interests in same-sex marriage cases, most
American courts run into difficulties by casting their net too broadly and,
at the same time, too narrowly. By focusing so much effort on justifying
the very existence of civil marriage, they fail to adequately examine what, if
any, interest the state has in excluding same-sex couples from that institu-
tion. For example, in Hernandez v. Robles and Citizens for Equal Protection
v. Bruning, the court spends a great deal of time painting marriage as an
institution built around procreation. 76 This distinction might explain why
states choose to offer marriage to those heterosexual couples capable of
reproducing, but it fails to address what interest the state might have in
excluding same-sex couples, particularly same-sex couples with children. 7 7
At the same time, it focuses too narrowly on the single thing that some
opposite-sex couples can do that same-sex couples cannot: produce biologi-
cal children who are the genetic result of a reproductive cell from each
partner. To say that this is the sine qua non of civil marriage is willfully
same-sex marriages on grounds of conscience and that same-sex couples should have
been incorporated into the pre-existing Marriage Act); see also Leila Samodian, Registra-
tion Backlog Stifles Civil Unions Act, CAPE ARGUS (CAPE TowN), Jan. 12, 2007, at 4; Kilian
Melloy, Red Tape Snarls South African Gay Marriages, EDGE, May 28, 2007, http://www.
edgeboston.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=glbt&sc2=news&sc3=&id=20659 (citing vari-
ous administrative difficulties resulting in long waits for same-sex marriage ceremonies
after passage of the Act).
73. See generally Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
(discussing both the individual liberty interest and the state's interest in crafting mar-
riage to promote the welfare of society).
74. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir.
2006).
75. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 558-63 (S. Afr.).
76. See, e.g., Bruning, 455 F.3d at 868 (purporting that the legitimate purpose of
"traditional marriage laws" is "to encourage heterosexual couples to bear and raise chil-
dren in committed marriage relationships"); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11
(N.Y. 2006) (defining the relevant state interest as "the protection of children").
77. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963 ("The department has offered no evidence that
forbidding marriage to people of the same sex will increase the number of couples
choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have and raise children.").
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under-reaching.7 8
Fourie's analysis is superior in that it considers a much broader range
of state interests in modern civil marriage and examines whether opening
marriage to same-sex couples would harm these interests. Among several
interests Fourie identifies are: (1) establishing a reciprocal duty of support
between partners, (2) regulating property interests, (3) establishing parent-
age and the duty to support children, and (4) providing public documenta-
tion of key relationships. 7 9 Fourie views the first interest as particularly
important to both the state and the married parties during the marriage or
at the unfortunate event of its dissolution.80 If a state wishes to promote
stable relationships and prevent individuals from unnecessary dispute or
destitution should those relationships fail, the American cases fail to indi-
cate why same-sex marriage would harm these state interests rather than
support them. Moreover, Fourie correctly points out that limiting the state
interest in marriage to its "procreative potential" confuses a religious value
judgment with the true breadth of legitimate state interests and is "deeply
demeaning" to married couples who cannot or choose not to have
children. 8 1
2. Liberty Interests
Another common error that American courts make is underestimating
the individual liberty interests at stake for same-sex couples seeking mar-
riage. A good example of this is how the courts try to circumvent the
heightened scrutiny necessary once marriage is acknowledged as a funda-
mental right. The Hernandez court relies on a convoluted analysis whereby
it argues that same-sex marriage cannot be a fundamental right because
the cases establishing marriage as a fundamental right dealt with opposite-
sex couples. Therefore, the statute in question does not restrict a funda-
mental right because it only prohibits gays and lesbians from enjoying
same-sex marriage. 8 2 Likewise, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in
Lewis, found that there was no fundamental right at stake because same-
sex marriage is not "deeply rooted in [the] State's history."8 3 In conclud-
ing that Nebraska's state constitutional ban on same-sex marriage is
acceptable under the U.S. Constitution, the Eighth Circuit points out that
no Supreme Court Justice has ever found the "traditional definition of mar-
riage" to violate Equal Protection.8 4 None of these decisions acknowledges
what Justice Kennedy emphasized in Lawrence, that "history and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point" of a rights
analysis. 85
78. Cf. id. at 962 (announcing that "such a narrow focus is inappropriate").
79. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 551-52 (S. Afr.).
80. Id. at 554.
81. Id. at 558.
82. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 14-15 (N.Y. 2006).
83. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 208 (NJ. 2006).
84. Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 870 (8th Cir. 2006).
85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (quoting County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)).
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Besides placing undue emphasis on the supposed distinction between
the fundamental right to "traditional marriage" and the supposed modern
heresy of same-sex marriage, the post-Goodridge cases inadequately weigh
the harm to individuals when states deny them their right to form a basic
contract and have that contract publicly recognized. For example, the con-
curring opinion in Hernandez posits that the current marriage statute does
not actually restrict the rights of gays and lesbians because they are free to
marry members of the opposite sex.8 6 Although this conclusion might
seem absurd to many onlookers, it is not surprising considering the insis-
tence with which the majority opinion refers to sexual orientation as
merely a "preference" and not a fundamental trait.8 7 None of the cases
address same-sex couples' inability to obtain many of the concrete benefits
of marriage, such as next-of-kin status, automatic inheritance, joint tax sta-
tus, and joint-parenting protections, through other "non-marriage"
means.8 8 By failing to acknowledge the importance of marrying a partner
of one's choosing, these decisions demean the importance of the human
bond at the heart of marriage and avoid an accurate inquiry into the indi-
vidual liberty interest involved.8 9
In contrast, the Fourie decision deals with the question of individual
rights more holistically. The South African constitution does not include
an express right to marry, but South African jurisprudence has established
that the state may not oppressively restrict the right to marry or choose a
spouse.90 When tackling the historical absence of marriage rights for
same-sex couples, the Fourie court simply acknowledges that family forma-
tions "evolve" and "develop," and that any state restrictions on the right of
individuals to marry and form families may not be "arbitrary."9 1 That is to
say, what constitutes a "traditional" marriage or a "traditional" family is
constantly evolving, and it is not the state's right to entrench one form of
marriage or family and burden all others, particularly when that burden is
imposed based on historical discrimination that has forced one form of
family to render itself invisible.9 2 Finally, Fourie truthfully acknowledges
not only that the duties of marriage are more diverse than procreation but
also that the rights associated with marriage are "vast."'9 3 Therefore, to
fence those rights off from a certain portion of the population is much
more than just a "small and tangential inconvenience." 94
86. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 14-18 (Graffeo, J., concurring).
87. See, e.g., id. at 17-19.
88. See ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS 177 (2005).
89. Cf. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 25 (Cal. 1948) (striking down the state's misce-
genation laws and noting that "[a] member of any of these races may find himself barred
by law from marrying the person of his choice and that person to him may be irreplacea-
ble. Human beings are bereft of worth and dignity by a doctrine that would make them
as interchangeable as trains.").
90. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 543 (S. Afr.).
91. See id. at 543, 548.
92. See id. at 548.
93. See id. at 552-53.
94. See id.
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3. The "Threat" to Third Party Institutions
In the United States, popular discourse on same-sex marriage often
focuses on the vague notion of the "threat" same-sex marriage would
pose. 95 Precisely who same-sex marriage threatens and who or what
should be "defended" from it is confusing in the social and political dis-
course and is even more confusing in the courtroom. Religious groups
opposed to gay rights often promulgate these "threat" arguments, but
courts attempt to appear neutral by deferring to a vague legislative preroga-
tive to protect the "institution of marriage" from same-sex incursions and
avoiding any discussion of the religious and gender norms the institution
implicitly imposes.9 6 At the same time, these arguments draw support
with the assertion that history and religion bolster the institution of mar-
riage. 97 The legitimacy of these historical-religious arguments is further
undermined by their failure to engage in meaningful discussion of whether
or not history and religion are legitimate reasons for state discrimination.
Ignoring Justice Kennedy's advice in Lawrence,9 8 the majority of American
courts have determined that a history of legitimizing discrimination is the
ending point of their analysis.
The South African Constitutional Court in Fourie directly confronts
the notion that same-sex marriage is a threat to religion and the institution
of marriage. Addressing religious concerns, the court points out that
although religious ministers often perform civil marriages (like in the
United States but unlike some countries that have completely divorced civil
from religious marriage), 99 legalizing same-sex marriage would in no way
compel ministers to perform ceremonies that go against their religious
beliefs.10 0 Furthermore, the court says, "It is one thing for the Court to
acknowledge the important role that religion plays in our public life. It is
quite another to use religious doctrine as a source for interpreting the Con-
stitution."'' 1 This is advice that American courts ruling on same-sex mar-
riage would do well to remember.
95. See RJcHARDs, supra note 27, at 139-40.
96. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 222 (NJ. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d
1, 51 (N.Y. 2006).
97. See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 204 ("[Olur leading religions view marriage as a union of
men and women recognized by God.") (quoting Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 269 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 36 n.4 ("[T]he institution of mar-
riage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of
children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.") (quoting Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971)).
98. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833 (1998)).
99. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1794
(2005) (Germany, Netherlands); Debora Gozzo, The New Brazilian Civil Code, 32 INT'LJ.
LEGAL INFO. 617, 619 (2004) (Brazil); Jorge A. Vargas, Concubines Under Mexican Law,
12 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 45, 83-84 (2005) (Mexico).
100. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 562 (S. Afr.).
101. See id. at 560.
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As for the need to protect and preserve the "institution of marriage,"
the Fourie court addresses this argument quite honestly. It breaks down
such rhetoric into two principles: (1) that "same-sex couples would under-
mine the institution of marriage" and (2) that they would "intrude upon
and offend against strong religious susceptibilities of certain sections of
the public. ' 10 2 The court then analyzes each argument's merits. Regard-
ing the former principle, the court simply acknowledges that granting
rights to same-sex couples in no way legally limits or affects the rights of
opposite-sex couples. 10 3 What opponents of same-sex marriage usually
mean when they talk about "demeaning the institution," however, is a con-
flation of the former with the latter-the notion that because of social dis-
approval of gays and lesbians, straight couples will think less of marriage if
gay couples are permitted to marry. Rather than ignoring this prejudice at
the heart of the "institution" argument, as the American cases do, the Con-
stitutional Court in Fourie speaks directly to this concern:
However strongly and sincerely-held the beliefs underlying the second pro-
position might be, these beliefs cannot through the medium of state-law be
imposed upon the whole of society and in a way that denies the fundamen-
tal rights of those negatively affected .... It might well be that negative
presuppositions about homosexuality are still widely entertained in certain
sectors of our society. The ubiquity of a prejudice cannot support its
legitimacy. 104
If American courts want to be honest about the interests that they are bal-
ancing in same-sex marriage cases, they need to stop hiding behind the
"institutional preservation" arguments. Like Fourie, they must analyze
exactly what and whom proponents of that rationale actually believe the
threat to be.
B. The Context of Discrimination
One continuing flaw with American same-sex marriage decisions
post-Goodridge is their persistent failure to examine the context of discrimi-
nation against gays and lesbians in the United States. This failure is dan-
gerous because it ignores two important factors in the discriminatory
nature of current marriage statutes: (1) the historical reasons for why
drafters of older state marriage statutes did not consider same-sex couples,
and (2) the prejudice and animosity against gays and lesbians that has
gone into drafting and passing newer "one man, one woman" marriage
statutes and amendments. The need to examine the context of discrimina-
tion is not new in American jurisprudence, and it is something the
Supreme Court showed itself willing to do in both Romer and Lawrence.10 5
The South African Constitutional Court in Fourie provides a possible
102. See id. at 568.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569-74 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 626-31 (1996).
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model for incorporating the examination of context into same-sex marriage
analysis.
1. Why History Matters
Hernandez and Lewis demonstrate the way courts interpret older mar-
riage laws as prohibiting same-sex marriage partly because the original leg-
islative authors-drafting laws decades or centuries in the past-never
would have considered same-sex marriage. 10 6 This enables the courts to
define the right at issue not as marriage generally, but rather as same-sex
marriage. 10 7 By defining the right narrowly, the courts easily conclude
that same-sex marriage must not be a fundamental right because it was not
discussed at the time these statutes were passed. 10 8 The problem with
such reasoning is not just that it defines the right at stake too narrowly but
that it turns one of the great historical harms suffered by gays and lesbi-
ans-the denial of their existence and the accompanying secrecy forced on
their very identities 0 9 -into a continuing rationale for discrimination
against them. Even so, Judge Smith, writing for the plurality of the Court
of Appeals of New York in Hernandez, seems particularly offended at any
implication that legislators were historically ignorant of, or prejudiced
against, same-sex couples. 1 0 He broadly claims:
Until a few decades ago, it was an accepted truth for almost everyone who
ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed, that there could be mar-
riages only between participants of different sex. A court should not lightly
conclude that everyone who held this belief was irrational, ignorant or
bigoted."'
Needless to say, the court cited no evidence supporting the implication
that early lawmakers had impartially considered the possibility of stable
same-sex relationships and had rationally rejected their inclusion in mar-
riage statutes.112
106. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 208-11 (NJ. 2006) (concluding that "we are
concerned only with the question of whether the right to same-sex marriage is deeply
rooted in this State's history and its people's collective conscience" and then finding that
it is not); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (N.Y. 2006) ("Articles 2 and 3 of the
Domestic Relations Law, which govern marriage, nowhere say in so many words that
only people of different sexes may marry each other, but that was the universal under-
standing when Articles 2 and 3 were adopted in 1909[.]").
107. See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 208-11; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 2-3.
108. See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 208-11; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 2-3.
109. See, RICHARDS, supra note 27, at 30-31.
110. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8.
111. Id. at 8. But see Cabaj, supra note 53, at 2-6 (discussing early precedence of
same-sex marriage in various forms and in a variety of cultures throughout history).
112. At least one critic of Smith's plurality opinion points out that the marriage stat-
ute, which was passed in 1909, likely was conceived without any particular slant for or
against gay rights at all, let alone same-sex marriage, making this line of reasoning
absurd at best. See Arthur S. Leonard, New Yorh Court of Appeals Rejects Marriage Claim,
4-2, 2006 LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 123, 124 (2006) (arguing instead that "Uludicial review
of an ancient statute under the rational basis test requires the court to imagine a contem-
porary legislature faced with the policy question and how it might justify adopting the
present-day statute").
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It is especially perverse that the Hernandez court attempted to pre-
empt the obvious counter-argument to the historical limitation of marriage,
the overturning of the historically supported ban on interracial marriage in
Loving, and asserted that, unlike sexual orientation discrimination, "for
centuries [racism was recognized] . . . as a revolting moral evil."1 1 3
Although this is a dubious claim, at least in the United States, the court did
not hesitate to compare the long horror of racism with the relative novelty
of disapproval of discrimination against gays and lesbians.1 4 Comparing
racial discrimination with sexual orientation discrimination creates inher-
ent problems and complexities, 11 5 but Loving shows the importance of his-
torical context by rejecting Virginia's argument that the law criminalizing
interracial marriage was acceptable because penalties applied "equally" for
whites and non-whites and concluding that, taken in context, the law was
part of historic efforts "to maintain White Supremacy." 1 16 Discrimination
based on race and sexual orientation need not be qualitatively similar in
order for courts to take a cue from Loving and consider how history,
shaped by a heterosexual majority, has created a "traditional definition" of
marriage that perpetuates the exclusion of gays and lesbians. 1 17
What Hernandez and Lewis deliberately ignore and what the Fourie
court points out is that many practices unquestioned in the past are now
regarded as patently unjust. 18 Discrimination against gays and lesbians is
a historical practice that, although still prevalent, must be firmly acknowl-
edged as an impermissible basis for law. 119 Fourie brings this historical
context into the equal protection analysis by discussing the harm that the
existing marriage statute causes to same-sex couples and by asking
113. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8.
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Blacklash?, NEW YORKER, May 17, 1993, at 42
(analyzing some African Americans' resistance to comparisons of gay rights with Afri-
can-American rights). But cf. Siobhan B. Somerville, Queer Loving, 11 GLQ: J. LESBIAN &
GAY STUD. 335 (2005) (extensively critiquing simplistic comparisons of Loving and inter-
racial marriage to the fight for same-sex marriage). Somerville discusses the intercon-
nectivity of race and sexual orientation in certain instances of discrimination but
asserts that "advocates of gay marriage who use Loving as a precedent obscure its limita-
tions, since its emancipatory claim of freedom to marry rests on the assumption that the
homosexual is excluded from the category of legitimate citizen-subject and the protec-
tions that accrue to it." Id. at 358.
116. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
117. See Lowell Tong, Comparing Mixed-Race and Same-Sex Marriage, in ON THE ROAD
TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 53, at 109, 109-10.
118. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 554-55 (S. Afr.)
("[T]he antiquity of a prejudice is no reason for its survival. Slavery lasted for a century
and a half in this country, colonialism for twice as long, the prohibition of interracial
marriages for even longer, and overt male domination for millennia. All were based on
apparently self-evident biological and social facts; all were once sanctioned by religion
and imposed by law; the first two are today regarded with total disdain, and the third
with varying degrees of denial, shame or embarrassment. Similarly, the fact that the law
today embodies conventional majoritarian views in no way mitigates its discriminatory
impact.").
119. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Moral disapproval of [gays and lesbians] is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy
rational basis review[.]").
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whether there is a permissible rational basis for this harm. 120 Through
this analysis, Fourie points out that the absence of gays and lesbians from
marriage statutes does not justify their exclusion but rather becomes part
of the harm itself. Fourie notes that the old law, however innocently,
inflicts discrimination on same-sex couples, explaining, "It is as if they did
not exist as far as the law is concerned. They are implicitly defined out of
contemplation as subjects of the law."12 1 Later, the court acknowledges
that "the default position of gays and lesbians is still one of exclusion and
marginalisation."'122 Without following Fourie's lead and examining the
context of historical discrimination against gays and lesbians and the influ-
ence of such discrimination on contemporary laws and justifications,
American courts will continue to miss the mark in their analysis.
2. Insiders and Outsiders
The post-Goodridge decisions do not consider another crucial ingredi-
ent in the balancing test: the extent to which existing marriage schemes
create and enforce the notions of heterosexual "insiders," who are privi-
leged, and homosexual "outsiders," who are not. This divergence was evi-
dent in the Bruning court's assertion that the Nebraska legislature is
justified in "choos[ing] not to expand in wholesale fashion" the groups
allowed the benefits of marriage; in other words, Nebraska acted reasona-
bly in choosing to privilege heterosexual couples over gay couples. 123 In
striking down the offending constitutional amendment in Romer, Justice
Kennedy points out that "laws of the kind now before us raise the inevita-
ble inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected."' 124 The Bruning court, however, ignores the
animosity and prevalence of anti-gay rhetoric involved in the push to pass
not only the Nebraska ban but also similar measures in other states. 125
The Court of Appeals of New York announces that the legislature rationally
could have decided that opposite-sex families are better at raising children
than same-sex families, despite contrary and abundant social-science evi-
120. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 554-55 (S. Afr.).
121. Id. at 555.
122. Id. at 556.
123. Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2006).
124. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
125. See RICHARDS, supra note 27, at 140-41; Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on
Sweeping Ban on Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at A9 (quoting State Attorney
General and amendment supporter Don Stenberg, who compared a union between two
men to a union between a man and a dog); Nancy Hicks, Initiative's Backers, Foes Speak
at Public Hearing, LINCOLN J. STAR, Oct. 12, 2000, at B2 (quoting supporter Rev. Al Ris-
kowski, who categorizes same-sex marriage as akin to stealing and murder); Leslie Reed,
Emotion Fills Debate over Gay Marriage, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 29, 2000, at 19
(quoting law professor Richard Duncan, who supported the amendment, describing
public opinion of same-sex unions as a split between "good" and "deep evil"); see also
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS 204-05 (2002). Eskridge discusses Romer's impact on rhetoric used by oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage, forcing "traditionalist allies ... [to] shy away from status
denigration or Biblical authority," and exchange "abomination" rhetoric for what he sees
as weaker arguments about issues like child rearing. Id.
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dence that the plaintiffs and amici submitted. 126 The ease with which the
court dismisses those studies as "limited" and fails to remark on the
absence of any studies showing that children fare worse in same-sex house-
holds sends a clear message to gays and lesbians: the court is paying strong
deference to the presumption of heterosexual superiority. 12 7 Most telling,
however, is the unwillingness of the court to discuss the symbolic impact
that exclusion from marriage has on same-sex couples.
The Fourie court describes this symbolic effect by criticizing the
existing marriage scheme for excluding same-sex couples not only from the
legal benefits and duties of marriage but also from the status and dignity
that marriage provides through official recognition of intimate relation-
ships. 1 28 At every analytical step, the court incorporates considerations of
several factors, including dignity, rights, and duties. 1 29 Rather than dis-
miss the less-tangible effects of the law, the court addresses their impor-
tance, explaining:
It represents a harsh if oblique statement by the law that same-sex couples
are outsiders, and that their need for affirmation and protection of their inti-
mate relations as human beings is somehow less than that of heterosexual
couples. It reinforces the wounding notion that they are to be treated as
biological oddities, as failed or lapsed human beings who do not fit into
normal society, and, as such, do not qualify for the full moral concern and
respect that our Constitution seeks to secure for everyone. It signifies that
their capacity for love, commitment and accepting responsibility is by defini-
tion less worthy of regard than that of heterosexual couples. 1 3 0
This creation of insiders and outsiders is precisely what the American
courts ignore in their analysis of same-sex marriage, although Justice
O'Connor admitted to its ubiquity in the sodomy statutes that Lawrence
struck down.' 3 ' The sodomy law in Lawrence created an "underclass" of
legal outsiders by associating gays and lesbians with criminality. The
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage statutes-whether deliber-
ately through recent actions or through the oversights of history, now
enforced by present interpretations-creates the same underclass of citi-
zens deemed officially unworthy of an important societal institution. The
Fourie analysis shows how sensitivity to this effect is vital when the courts
126. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8-9 (N.Y. 2006).
127. See id.
128. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 556 (S. Afr.).
129. See, e.g., id. at 543, 556, 558, 561, 567.
130. Id. at 553.
131. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[Blecause Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consensual
acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals
than as a tool to stop criminal behavior .... ITihe State cannot single out one identifi-
able class of citizens for punishment that does not apply to everyone else, with moral
disapproval as the only asserted state interest for the law. The Texas sodomy statute
subjects homosexuals to 'a lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that
threatens the creation of an underclass ... cannot be reconciled with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause"' (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982)).
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must weigh admission into an institution that sends as strong a message of
governmental approval as marriage does.
C. The International Question
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally shied away from
international legal analysis, the Lawrence decision showed that such analy-
sis might provide valuable insight, particularly in the area of gay rights. 132
Gay rights analysis is particularly amenable to international input because,
due to the historical absence of gay rights from the general rights dis-
course, 1 3 3 it is a relatively new area of rights analysis. Thus, the key Amer-
ican legal documents are frequently unhelpful, as they were not expressly
designed to address the gay rights issue. South Africa is a logical place to
look for useful analysis, because its legal system grants credibility and
weight to sources of international and foreign law. 134 Therefore, an exami-
nation of the international and regional bases for the rights at issue here
should prove particularly fruitful.
1. What International Law Really States
Unfortunately, international analysis is one aspect of the Fourie deci-
sion that the Constitutional Court does not fully develop. The Court
rightly interprets provisions of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) to enshrine the fundamental right of men and women of
appropriate age to marry and form families. 13 5 It also notes that, in 2002,
the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled in Joslin v. New Zea-
land that the ICCPR does not require states to recognize same-sex mar-
riages. 13 6 The Fourie decision interprets Joslin as signifying that although
opposite-sex marriage is an internationally protected right, same-sex mar-
riage is both unprotected and un-prohibited, 13 7 but the true current situa-
tion is more complex.
Until recently, it was unthinkable to believe that principles of equal
protection and non-discrimination could prevent state discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation; however, this notion has won increasing
international acceptance over the last few decades, not just in South
Africa. 138 Nations are not only recognizing equality for people of all sex-
132. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1981) for support of the premise that the right to engage in private sexual
activity with a same-sex partner is acknowledged in other Western countries).
133. See supra Part II.B.1.
134. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 39(1)(b)-(c).
135. See U.N. Charter art. 16, paras. 1-3; International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
136. Joslin v. New Zealand, GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., UN Commun. 902/1999, Doc
A/57/40 (July 30, 2002).
137. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 565 (S. Afr.).
138. See, e.g., Egan v. Canada, 119951 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.) (reading "sexual orienta-
tion" into the Charter of Rights); Toonen v. Australia, GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., UN
Commun. 488/1992, Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994) (holding that the
reference to "sex" in Art. 2(1) (a non-discrimination clause) of the ICCPR must be read
Vol. 40
2007 The Horizons of Rights
ual orientations, but they are beginning to naturally extend this idea to
encompass relationship recognition and the right to family life. Along with
France and the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Swe-
den, Iceland, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Switzerland, Hun-
gary, Portugal, Croatia, and New Zealand have granted same-sex couples
some form of relationship recognition under national law, and sub-
national jurisdictions in several other countries have done the same. 139
Even the Joslin decision provided evidence that states may be under an
obligation to provide some form of relationship recognition to same-sex
couples, with two dissenting justices pointing out that unless such state
recognition involves "consequences similar to or identical with those of
marriage[,] ... denial of certain rights or benefits to same-sex couples that
are available to married couples may amount to discrimination prohibited
under article 26 [(a non-discrimination provision)]."' 140 Clearly, the legal
obligation of states to recognize and protect same-sex families on an equal
basis with opposite-sex families is far from settled under international
opinion. Nevertheless, American courts should start to take notice of the
sufficient evidence that significant numbers of international actors believe
states have some obligation to these families.
2. The Weight of International Opinion
Once courts recognize the diversity of international legal opinion on
same-sex families, they need to determine how to use this information.
Because of the different treatment of international law in the U.S. and
South African constitutions, 14 1 the Fourie model is less helpful here. Jus-
tice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lawrence provides one possible model
for incorporating and weighing international opinion in gay rights analy-
sis. 14 2 His model is perhaps best adapted for use by American courts. Jus-
tice Kennedy cites the Dudgeon v. United Kingdom 14 3 decision, in which the
European Court of Human Rights held that Ireland's laws criminalizing
consensual same-sex activity violated individual rights, but rather than cit-
ing the case for its substantive law, Kennedy uses the decision to provide
evidence of developing international trends and human rights norms. 14 4
More particularly, he uses the case, which is binding in forty-six nations
(forty-five at the time Kennedy cited it), to counter the idea that the right to
engage in private, consensual sexual conduct is anomalous or "insubstan-
tial" in prevailing Western society.14 5 This use of international opinion is
to include sexual orientation); Elizabeth Kukura, Finding Family: Considering the Recog-
nition of Same-Sex Families in International Human Rights Law and the European Court of
Human Rights, HUM. RTs. BRIEF, Winter 2006, at 17, 17 n.2.
139. Kukura, supra note 138, at 18.
140. Joslin v. New Zealand, GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., UN Commun. 902/1999, Doc.
A/57/40 (July 30, 2002) (Lallah and Scheinin, concurring).
141. Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, with S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 39(1)(b)-(c).
142. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
143. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
144. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
145. See id. at 573.
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particularly salient to the issue of same-sex marriage, especially when
opponents argue that there is no room in the traditional institution of mar-
riage for same-sex couples or that the right to non-discrimination that gays
and lesbians assert is mere confabulation. In such cases, international
opinion can provide helpful input on trends and targets for non-discrimi-
nation and equal protection of same-sex couples.
D. What's in a Name
There is one aspect of the same-sex marriage analysis that courts
largely have ignored since Goodridge but that undoubtedly will grow in
importance as non-marriage relationship schemes are established in more
state and local jurisdictions: the relative importance of the title that the law
gives to same-sex relationships. Bruning and Hernandez never even reach
the naming issue, instead implying that, without the right to marry, same-
sex couples have no claim to the accompanying bundle of legal privileges
attached to marriage. 14 6 Lewis separates the name "marriage" from the
bundle of privileges associated with it and finds that although same-sex
couples currently have no right to the former, they have a right to the lat-
ter. 147 Deferring to the legislature's latitude to classify and define mar-
riage, the court announces that it "will not presume that a difference in
name alone is of constitutional magnitude.' 148 Surely it is odd that after
finding that the state cannot withhold the rights and benefits associated
with marriage from same-sex couples, the court allows the state to with-
hold the name "marriage" itself, even as it cites the "evocative and impor-
tant meaning" of the word. 14 9 Because the court offers no valid basis for
this distinction under equal protection reasoning other than deference to
the legislative branch,15 0 which it already held is insufficient to deny same-
sex couples the rights and benefits in the first place, there is ample room to
speculate that political factors, such as fear of public reaction, influenced
the court. By its reluctance to perform more than a cursory inquiry, the
court throws away any chance it might have had to examine the impor-
tance of the name "marriage" and any opportunity to convince the plain-
tiffs that the name is not of constitutional significance.
Perhaps the Supreme Court of New Jersey was reluctant to perform a
more thorough inquiry into the significance of naming because it was
afraid to reach the same result as the Fourie court. As this Note discussed
in Part II.B.2, i 15 the Fourie decision emphasizes that although the legal
benefits and consequences are a significant part of what is at stake in this
rights analysis, they are not the only considerations. The desire of same-
sex couples to marry also implicates these individuals' wish "to live openly
146. See Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006); Her-
nandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
147. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 225 (NJ. 2006).
148. Id. at 222.
149. Id. at 221.
150. See id. at 222-23.
151. See supra Part II.B.2.
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and freely" and to achieve an important symbolic measure of equality and
dignity.15 2 The South African Constitutional Court cautions the legisla-
ture that it must "avoid a remedy that on the face of it would provide equal
protection, but would do so in a manner that in its context and application
would be calculated to reproduce new forms of marginalisation."'1 5 3 As
American courts should recognize, the South African decision points out
that "[hlistorically the concept of 'separate but equal' served as a thread-
bare cloak for covering distaste for or repudiation by those in power of the
group subjected to segregation." 154 In addition to the message of repudia-
tion implicit in creating separate non-marriage classifications for same-sex
couples, the Supreme Court of New Jersey admits that one such classifica-
tion, the state's domestic partnership registry, 15 5 has failed to provide
couples with the security and full scope of rights attached to the name
"marriage."' 15 6 Unfortunately, the Lewis decision concludes that the solu-
tion lies in simply tacking on more of the missing rights for same-sex
couples, rather than admitting that without the recognition the name "mar-
riage" affords, society as a whole is unlikely to treat these parallel institu-
tions as equally valid.' 5 7 Withholding the name "marriage" from same-sex
relationships does nothing to fight the isolation of gays and lesbians from
existing legal structures and does not acknowledge, as Fourie does, "the
profound role [marriage plays] in terms of the way our society regards
itself."'158 Although the Fourie decision, like Lewis, leaves the ultimate task
of remedying inequality in the hands of the legislative branch, it provides a
much stronger impetus for the legislature to genuinely consider the mes-
sage that the name they choose will send.
Conclusion
The legal analysis of same-sex marriage, like the analysis of gay rights
more generally, is still relatively young. Perhaps it is to be expected that
courts will finesse and improve the application of judicial methods as time
passes. Nevertheless, if American courts wish to retain their reputation not
only for fairness but for a reluctance to twist the rights of the minority to
fit the political will of the majority, then they must stop hiding behind a
legislative history that fails to acknowledge the existence of gays and lesbi-
ans. By looking to the South African Constitutional Court's decision in
152. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 576 (S. Afr.).
153. Id. at 580.
154. Id.
155. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2(d) (West 2006).
156. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 215-17 (NJ. 2006).
157. See id. at 221-22. But see id. at 229-30 (Poritz, CJ., dissenting and concurring)
("[A]s the majority painstakingly demonstrates, the Domestic Partnership Act does not
provide many of the tangible benefits that accrue automatically when heterosexual
couples marry. New Jersey's statutes reflect both abhorrence of sexual orientation dis-
crimination and a desire to prevent same-sex couples from having access to one of soci-
ety's most cherished institutions, the institution of marriage." (citing NJ. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26:8A-1 to -13 (West 2006); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 215-17)).
158. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 583 (S. Afr.).
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Fourie, this Note shows several crucial ways in which the post-Goodridge
cases in the United States fail to adequately consider what is really at stake
in the fight for state recognition of same-sex marriage.
Perhaps the American courts have been reluctant, thus far, because of
an unfortunate national tendency to think of discrimination as a historical
ill that is no longer widely present in the United States. Certainly, cases
like Bruning, Lewis, and Hernandez evince a judicial blindness to the very
real discrimination that same-sex marriage bans propagate and ignore the
multitude of harms that they cause in the lives of same-sex families. With
apartheid still in the living memory of its people, the South African judici-
ary does not have the luxury of forgetting the harms of discrimination or
pretending that a long history of exclusion is justification enough for a
static law. Until American judges and lawmakers are willing to learn from
Fourie's analysis by adapting and improving upon it-acknowledging all of
the factors at stake in balancing rights, including the less tangible ones,
and considering their own domestic analysis in light of foreign and interna-
tional developments-the balance will remain skewed against same-sex
families before the doors to the courtroom even open. The horizon of
rights may indeed be limitless, but courts must open their eyes fully in
order to appreciate it.
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